My condolences to the family of former Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos upon his passing. I had regular meetings with President Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola while I held senior positions in African affairs in the U.S. Government from 1986 to 1993. At all times, I found him to be a sincere believer in peace and democracy for his people. While his tenure in office was undermined by civil war and fiscal mismanagement, I believe he set the stage for the strong democratic and anti-corruption systems that followed.
Angola gained its independence from colonial Portugal in 1975 under highly unfavorable conditions. Three insurgent groups, the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA, had been fighting against Portuguese rule since 1960. The MPLA, led by Russian educated Eduardo Dos Santos, controlled power in the capital city Luanda with the indispensable assistance of 5,000 Cuban troops sent by Fidel Castro. UNITA, under the leadership of Dr. Jonas Savimbi, controlled a small enclave near the southeastern Angolan town Jamba. Its support came from the governments of South Africa and Zambia. In 1982, the FNLA, under Holden Roberto, was operational in Northern Angola with the support of the Government of Zaire.
Because of the presence of Cuban troops, as well as the MPLA’s close affiliation with the Portuguese Communist Party, the United States did not have diplomatic relations with Angola. In addition, The U.S. Congress, fearing a repeat of the Vietnam experience, enacted legislation in 1975 forbidding any U.S. involvement in the Angolan civil war. The 1975 law was repealed in 1982, thereby allowing the Reagan administration to begin sending arms and other material to UNITA, which had become the strongest opponent of the Dos Santos regime.
In 1986, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker, and I, as Senior Director for Africa on the National Security Council staff, began periodic unofficial visits to President Dos Santos in Luanda. At all times, he was polite and open to ideas. But he was adamant that a solution to the Angolan civil war could be achieved only with the end of external support to the MPLA and FNLA insurgents.
In 1988, South Africa, Angola and Cuba reached an important agreement. Namibia would become independent after a two-year transition, and all Cuban troops would depart Angola, effective immediately. The departure of the Cuban troops removed a major issue for the United States with respect to the Angolan civil war, but Washington nevertheless maintained an interest in the conflict. Angola was a major exporter of crude oil, and the American company Chevron was the main oil company producing that crude oil.
A breakthrough was achieved in March 1990, during the George H.W. Bush administration. As head of the U.S. delegation to the Namibian independence celebration that month, Secretary of State James Baker, and I, met with President Dos Santos in the capital city Windhoek. Baker explained to Dos Santos that U.S. support for UNITA was not designed for regime change in Angola, but to prevent UNITA from being defeated. The U.S believed that it was time to begin negotiations to end the civil war. To our great surprise, Dos Santos agreed. As a result, negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA began. The U.S. provided official observers, as well as technical support from the military attaché’s office at the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon. Because of its support to UNITA, the South African Government was also involved in the negotiations. Because of its heavy financial support to the MPLA regime, including financing of the Cuban expeditionary force, the Soviet Government kept in close contact with the U.S. on this issue.
The negotiations did not make much progress until 1991 when the Cuban government joined the discussions with the approval of Secretary of State George Shultz. A final agreement was reached in December 1991 in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo that called for an immediate cease-fire, and the organization of a presidential election in September 1992. The Soviets, of course, were very pleased because their financial burden had been two billion dollars per year.
To celebrate the peace deal, President Bush invited President Dos Santos to the White House. He arrived with his 18-year-old daughter Isabel who was enrolled at a U.S. University. President Bush was immediately smitten by this charming young lady. He had her sit at his desk and use the telephone to call anywhere in the world.
The peace agreement called for a multiparty election in September 1992. The U.S. provided equipment for UNITA to be able to monitor the voting at every polling station. The director of elections was a Portuguese civil servant. The result gave Dos Santos a victory over Savimbi, 49% to 40%, with the rest to minor candidates. Since no candidate received more than 50%, a runoff was required. Before the runoff could take place, Dr. Savimbi declared the election to be fraudulent, and returned to civil war that did not end until he was killed by the Angolan army in 2002. When I saw Dos Santos for the last time, immediately after the election, he told me that his true election score had been 52%. He asked that it be reduced to 49% in order to give Savimbi a second opportunity in a runoff election.
Although very much a disciple of Marxism as defined by the former Soviet Union, President Dos Santos had a “democratic” side that enabled him to maintain cordial relations with many different political agents. I considered him to be a true friend.